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I. INTRODUCTION
1

There is a great need for blood in the United States. Each year,
2
4.5 million Americans will need a blood transfusion. The American
Association of Blood Banks (AABB) estimates that 10.8 million volunteers donate blood each year, less than ten percent of the eligible
3
donors. The great need for blood, coupled with the small pool of
donors, has resulted in blood shortages that jeopardize the execution
4
of medical procedures. The blood supply in the United States has
5
reached a breaking point.
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J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Pennsylvania Law School, B.A., 2007 University of Arkansas. Special thanks to Professor Sophia Z. Lee for her guidance in this process and to
my partner, Christopher R. Howland, who provided feedback and encouragement.
See, e.g., Blood FAQ, AABB, http://www.aabb.org/resources/bct/Pages/bloodfaq.aspx
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (“Every day in the U.S., approximately 44,000 units of blood
are required in hospitals and emergency treatment facilities for patients with cancer and
other diseases, for organ transplant recipients, and to help save the lives of accident/trauma victims. In 2008, more than twenty-three million blood components were
transfused. And with an aging population and advances in medical treatments and procedures requiring blood transfusions, the demand for blood continues to increase.”).
56 Facts About Blood, AM.’S BLOOD CTRS., http://www.americasblood.org/
go.cfm?do=page.view&pid=12 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
See AABB, supra note 1 (stating that “AABB estimates that 10.8 million volunteers donate
blood each year” and that “less than 10 percent” of the U.S. population “eligible to donate blood at any given time” actually do so).
See Ishani Ganguli, Blood Shortage Puts Safety Measures in Question, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2007,
10:23 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/09/10/us-usa-health-blood-idUSN
0642622220070910?pageNumber=1 (noting that “American blood banks experienced
one of their driest summers in history” and that “[i]n Washington’s Georgetown University Hospital, officials came close to canceling nonemergency operations several times this
summer”).
See Red Cross Blood Supply Drops to Critically Low Levels, AM. RED CROSS (July 11, 2011),
http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.94aae335470e233f6cf911df43181aa0
/?vgnextoid=2b24ae4376d01310VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD (stating that the American Red Cross “issued an appeal for blood donors to roll up a sleeve and address a critical
shortage across the nation”).
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FDA regulations require blood collection establishments, such as
the American Red Cross, to screen potential blood and plasma do6
nors for risk factors related to HIV and other infectious diseases. To
comply with the FDA’s policy, on the date of the donation, blood donation centers are required to assess each prospective donor’s medi7
cal history. Generally, a donor must be healthy, be at least 17 years
8
old, and weigh at least 110 lbs. However, regulations identify certain
9
“high-risk” donors that are “deferred.” Among the deferred groups
that may not donate blood, the FDA guidance materials identify men
who have had sexual contact with other men (“MSM”), even once,
10
11
since 1977, as high-risk. These men are given a lifetime deferral.
12
In response to growing pressure from LGBT advocacy groups,
13
14
15
political figures, and state and local governments, the U.S. De-
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See 21 C.F.R. § 640.3(b)(6) (2011) (describing FDA qualifications of potential whole
blood donors); 21 C.F.R. § 640.63(c)(9) (describing FDA qualifications of potential
plasma donors).
See 21 C.F.R. § 640.3 (describing FDA requirements for determining the suitability of a
potential donor of whole blood).
See Eligibility Requirements, AM. RED CROSS, http://www.redcrossblood.org/donatingblood/eligibility-requirements (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (describing eligibility requirements for blood donors).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
PREVENTION OF HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS (HIV) TRANSMISSION BY BLOOD AND
BLOOD PRODUCTS
2
(1992),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformtion/
OtherRecommendationsforManufactuers/MemorandumtoBloodEstablishments/
UCM062834.pdf (explaining that the “implications for donors who have engaged in certain high-risk activities” may include a donor being considered “unsuitable,” which may
result in a “deferral”).
See id. at 2–3 (including “[m]en who have had sex with another man even one time since
1977” under the “Criteria for the Exclusion of Unsuitable Donors Who Are at Increased
Risk for HIV” section).
See id. at 3 (listing “[m]en who have had sex with another man even one time since 1977”
as a group that “should not donate blood or blood components”).
See, e.g., JOSEPH J. WARDENSKI ET AL., GAY MEN’S HEALTH CRISIS, A DRIVE FOR CHANGE:
REFORMING U.S. BLOOD DONATION POLICIES i–iii (Sean Cahill et. al. eds., 2010), available
at
http://www.gmhc.org/files/editor/file/a_blood_ban_report2010.pdf
(providing
background on the development of the policy and arguing that the ban is outdated).
See Michelle Garcia, Kerry Calls for Gay Blood Ban Repeal, ADVOCATE.COM (July 26, 2010,
6:30 PM), http://www.advocate.com/News/Daily_News/2010/07/26/Kerry_Calls_for_
Gay_Blood_Ban_Repeal/ (describing Senator Kerry’s “effort to get the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration to revise its current policy barring all gay men from donating
blood”).
See Dan Aiello, Ending the Federal Ban on Gay Blood Donations, CAL. PROGRESS REP. (Aug. 19,
2009), http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/node/252 (noting that “the Assembly Judiciary Committee [in California] passed AJR 13, the U.S. Blood Donor Nondiscrimination Resolution,” which “call[ed] upon the nation’s Food and Drug Administration to end its . . . ban on gay men donating blood to the nation’s blood banks”).
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partment of Health and Human Services’ Advisory Committee on
Blood Safety and Availability met on June 11, 2010 to reconsider the
16
MSM ban.
Despite significant changes in testing since the ban was originally
17
implemented, the Committee decided to retain the twenty-five year
old policy that bans blood donation by any man who has had sex with
18
a man at any time, even once, since 1977. In a 9-6 vote, the Committee cited a lack of research to support the notion that lifting the
19
ban would not contaminate the blood supply.
This FDA Policy raises questions of constitutionality and legality
because it is predicated on assumptions about HIV/AIDS that are not
20
based in fact or theory, but based on mere stigma. The policy actually provides a one-two punch: at the same time as the policy reinforces negative stereotypes that gay men are carriers of communica-
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See ROBERT JACKSON, LEGISLATIVE AND COMMUNITY REPORT 2 (2010), available at
http://www.council.nyc.gov/d7/html/members/pdf/community_report_04.30.2010.pdf
(explaining that “the [New York City] Council passed a resolution calling on the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to eliminate its’ [sic] 30 year old prohibition on
blood donation by gay and bisexual men” because the “ban was based on prejudice, a
knee-jerk reaction, and misunderstandings about the HIV/AIDS disease” and because
“[g]iven the constant need for blood, it [did] not make common sense to prohibit donations from an entire population”); see also Res. 18-486, 2010 Council of D.C (D.C. 2010),
available at http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/00001/20100607125919.pdf
(explaining that on June 1, 2010 the Washington, D.C. Council passed a resolution calling on the FDA to “reverse the lifetime deferment of blood donations by men who have
had sex with men since 1977 in favor of a policy that protects the safety and integrity of
the blood supply that is based on an up-to-date scientific criteria [sic]”).
See HHS Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., 1 (June 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ash/bloodsafety/advisorycommittee/
recommendations/06112010_recommendations.pdf (voting on whether “current indefinite deferral for men who have had sex with another man even one time since 1977
[should] be changed”).
See Neal Conan, FDA Ban On Blood Donated By Gay Men Upheld, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June
29, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128193248 (describing the improved method of testing blood that scientists have recently developed called
“nucleic acid testing”).
See Jacqueline Mroz, Gay Men Condemn Blood Ban as Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at D5
(describing the reaction of the gay community and others to the FDA’s decision to
uphold the ban preventing gay men from donating blood).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 16, at 1 (summarizing the HHS
Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability’s decision to continue the “indefinite deferral for men who have had sex with another man even one time since 1977”).
See Whitney Larkin, Discriminatory Policy: Denying Gay Men the Opportunity to Donate Blood,
11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 121 (2011) (arguing that the out-dated policy is discriminatory). But see Adam R. Pulver, Gay Blood Revisionism: A Critical Analysis of Advocacy and
the “Gay Blood Ban,” 17 L. & SEXUALITY 107, 127–28 (2008) (arguing that there are legitimate public health justifications for preventing gay men from donating blood).
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21

ble diseases just because of their orientation, it undermines the
FDA’s need for potential blood donors by rejecting healthy gay do22
nors. The policy also provides false security to high-risk heterosexual donors because it ignores risky heterosexual behaviors, such as
multiple partners and unprotected sex, which potentially endanger
23
one’s health and possibly the blood supply.
This Comment will build upon the scholarly work that others have
24
started to address the various available legal avenues to challenge
the FDA’s MSM policy. Part II will briefly discuss the history leading
to the current FDA Policy and the science that undermines the Advisory Committee’s conclusions. Part III will address potential constitutional challenges to the FDA Policy and explain how recent Supreme
Court decisions, and interpretations of those decisions, change the
legal landscape in favor of repeal. Part IV provides a roadmap for
APA challenges to the FDA Policy and explains how these challenges
differ from constitutional claims, augmenting the available legal arguments against the policy. Finally, Part V will conclude by exploring
the ways in which administrative constitutionalism could play a role in
a successful challenge to the blood ban through the Administrative
Process.

21

22

23

24

See SuchIsLifeVideos, Bryan Fischer On Why GOProud Was Disinvited To CPAC 2012,
YOUTUBE
(Aug.
4,
2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=
player_embedded&v=qXRrogq-FGg (“Now one of the reasons and I think this is where
our argument[] [rejecting gays] [is] infallible . . . is the danger that homosexual contact
imposes to human health . . . . It’s not a lifestyle. It is a death-style.”).
See Zachary Roth, Man Says He Was Rejected by Blood Bank for Seeming Gay, YAHOO! NEWS
(July 18, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/lookout/man-says-rejected-blood-bankseeming-gay-151627659.html (“[A] recent study found that the gay ban costs hospitals
219,000 pints of blood each year.”); see also Naomi G. Goldberg & Gary J. Gates, Effects of
Lifting the Blood Donation Ban on Men Who Have Sex With Men, 5 PITTSBURGH J. ENVTL. &
PUB. HEALTH L. 49, 57 (2011) (“If the current MSM ban were completely lifted, we estimate that an additional 130,150 men would likely donate 219,200 additional pints of
blood each year.”).
See John G. Culhane, Bad Science, Worse Policy: The Exclusion of Gay Males from Donor Pools,
24 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 129, 130 (2005) (arguing that the blood ban is bad public
health policy and harms the LGBT community).
See, e.g., Michael Christian Belli, The Constitutionality of the “Men Who Have Sex With Men”
Blood Donor Exclusion Policy, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 315, 371–73 (2003) (posing equal protection challenges to the blood ban as applied to “Healthy Gay Men”). Note that this article was written prior to the Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), decision. See also Luke A. Boso,
Note, The Unjust Exclusion of Gay Sperm Donors: Litigation Strategies to End Discrimination in
the Gene Pool, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 843, 845–46 (2008) (explaining how the similar FDA ban
on gay sperm is potentially challengeable under the Equal Protection Clause and the
Administrative Procedure Act).
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II. THE MSM BAN
In July of 1982, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”)
became the “official name of a mysterious organism that was believed
to be causing homosexuals, hemophiliacs, Haitians, and intravenous
25
drug users to develop a variety of opportunistic infections.” Little
was known about the disease, leaving the medical and LGBT com26
munities utterly confused about an appropriate response. The Cen27
ters for Disease Control (“CDC”) proposed deferral guidelines—
asking people in high-risk groups such as gay men, Haitians, and
drug users to refrain from donating blood—at their summer 1982
28
meeting. However, opposition to the CDC proposal was widespread,
shared by the National Hemophilia Foundation and the LGBT com29
munity alike.
It became increasingly clear, though, both in the
30
United States and abroad, that a response to the threat of AIDS
31
within the blood supply was necessary. This Part provides the history and legal landscape of regulations promulgated for the purposes
of securing the blood supply, and describes the technological ad-
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31

See Belli, supra note 24, at 328 (chronicling “the AIDS crisis in the United States and HIV
testing methods developed since its advent”).
See Linda Dorney, Book Note, And The Band Played on Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic,
3 J. PHARMACY & L. 55, 56 (1994) (reviewing RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON:
POLITICS, PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1988) (describing the initial confusion within
the medical community regarding AIDS)).
See Sherry Glied, Markets Matter: U.S. Responses to the HIV-Infected Blood Tragedy, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1493, 1495–96 (1996) (“The CDC has no direct regulatory power. It provides epidemiologic information and technical support to other regulatory agencies and information to medical providers and the public, but relies on the FDA and other Public Health
Service agencies to implement its recommendations. It issued regular surveillance reports and initiated meetings of blood banks, manufacturers, and the FDA during the early 1980s, but its recommendations were often ignored in the face of opposition from powerful interest groups, especially blood bankers and gay rights activists.”).
See SHILTS, supra note 26 (describing the CDC’s proposed deferral guidelines).
See Pulver, supra note 20, at 111 (describing the negative reaction to the CDC proposal).
See Francine A. Hochberg, HIV/AIDS and Blood Donation Policies: A Comparative Study of
Public Health Policies and Individual Rights Norms, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 231, 231–32
(2002) (comparing the U.S. blood donation policy to five other countries that also ban
“blood donations by MSM”); see also Rachael Lake, MSM Blood Donation Ban: (In)Equality,
Gay Rights and Discrimination Under the Charter, 15 APPEAL 136, 136 (2010) (arguing that
Canada’s ban on gay blood is discriminatory); Adrian Lomaga, Are Men Who Have Sex With
Men Safe Blood Donors?, 12 APPEAL 73, 85–88 (2007) (arguing that the Canadian ban on
gay blood is unconstitutional).
See Robin Marantz Henig, AIDS: A New Disease’s Deadly Odyssey, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1983, at
SM28 (describing the fear that many felt at the time regarding AIDS contamination in
the nation’s blood supply and the “intensified” “efforts to find its cause and stop its
spread”).
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vancements that now make those policies both unresponsive to the
goals they originally sought and legally problematic.
A. History and Legal Landscape
The U.S. Public Health Service (“PHS”), housed within the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for national
32
public health.
The specific responsibility for developing policies to ensure the
quality and safety of the blood supply was delegated to the Center for
33
Biologics Evaluation and Research (“CBER”) under the guidance of
34
the FDA. The FDA implements policies related to blood and other
bodily organs, tissues, and fluids; the policies are drafted by the CBER
35
The FDA is charged with licensing
through federal regulations.
36
blood banks, and is therefore responsible for creating safeguards to
32

33

34

35

36



See James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J. L. & HEALTH
309, 337 (1997–98) (“The United States Public Health Service, now a part of the Department of Health and Human Services, is the federal unit with primary responsibility for
national public health.”). The PHS was originally the Marine Hospital Service; it was renamed in 1912. Id. at 331–32. Since that time, the PHS has grown from administering
health services to marines to administering many of the operative agencies of the United
States Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”), including the CDC, the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the
Human Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). Id. at 337.
The National Center for Drug and Biologics (“NCDB”) and its Office of Biologics were
established as part of the FDA in 1982. See 47 Fed. Reg. 26913, 26913–14, 26919 (June 22,
1982). Both were reorganized two years later into the Center for Drugs and Biologics
(“CDB”) and the Office of Biologics Research and Review, respectively. See 49 Fed. Reg.
10168, 10168, 10172–73 (Mar. 19, 1984). In 1987, the FDA established two centers to replace the CDB: the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (“CDER”) and the Center
for Biologics Evaluation and Research (“CBER”). See 52 Fed. Reg. 38275 (Oct. 15, 1987).
In 1988, the Office of Biologics Research and Review—under the authority of the
CBER—became the Office of Biologics Research. See 53 Fed. Reg. 8978, 8980 (Mar. 18,
1988). The Office of Biologics Research is under the umbrella of the Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) and “sends its memoranda out under the HHS
heading of ‘Public Health Service, Food and Drug Administration.’” Steven R. Salbu,
AIDS and the Blood Supply: An Analysis of Law, Regulation, and Public Policy, 74 WASH. U. L.
Q. 913, 947 n.192 (1996).
See 21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a)(1), 5.10(a)(4) (2004) (delegating to the FDA authority vested in
the Secretary of DHHS under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.
§§ 301–309 (2006)) and under sections 351 and 352 of the Public Health Service Act (relevant provisions codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 262–263 (2006)).
Authority vested in the Secretary of Health and Human Services under section 361 of the
Public Health Service Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2006)) includes the law enforcement functions of the FDA. These functions concern, among other subjects, blood and
blood products, and have been re-delegated by the Secretary to the Commissioner of
Food and Drugs. 21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a)(3).
See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2006); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360(b) (2006) (requiring processing
establishments, including blood banks, to register with the FDA); 42 U.S.C. § 262(c)
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minimize the risk that blood infected with infectious diseases, such as
37
AIDS, will make its way into the blood pool.
To that end, the FDA has established requirements relating to the
38
39
licensing of blood banks, the testing of blood prior to its release,
40
To comply with the FDA’s policy,
and the eligibility of donors.
blood donation centers are required to assess each prospective do41
nor’s medical, social, and sexual history on the date of the donation.
Although these regulations do not specifically identify MSM donors
42
as a high risk group, the FDA has issued guidance materials identifying MSM individuals as among the high risk groups that may not do43
nate blood.
In the United States, blood donor restrictions have evolved
44
through the years. In March of 1983, the first non-mandatory guide45
lines were issued by the Office of Biologics recommending members
of groups at “increased risk for AIDS” to refrain from donating plas-

37

38

39

40
41
42

43
44
45

(2006) (allowing the FDA to inspect blood or blood product facilities that participate in
interstate commerce); Snyder v. Am. Ass’n of Blood Banks, 676 A.2d 1036, 1039 (N.J.
1996) (“The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), an agency of the Public Health Service (PHS) in the United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), inspects and licenses blood banks and other blood facilities.”).
See About the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/cber/about.htm (last modified Sept. 30, 2011) (explaining how
CBER’s responsibilities in this regard derive from the Public Health Service Act and from
specific sections of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006) (establishing licensure requirements for biological products
introduced into interstate commerce); 21 C.F.R. § 606.100 (2010) (outlining standard
operating procedures for collecting, processing, testing, storing, and distributing blood
and blood components for transfusion and manufacturing purposes).
See 21 C.F.R. § 610.40 (2010) (requiring blood collection establishments to test blood donations for evidence of infection at the time of collection); 21 C.F.R. § 640.5 (requiring
lab tests of blood specimens to occur at the time of donation).
See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.50 (2011) (requiring donors to be “free from risk factors for, and
clinical evidence of, infection”).
See 21 C.F.R. § 640.3(a) (2010) (requiring that blood donation centers assess each prospective donor’s medical history).
See 21 C.F.R. § 640.3(b)–(f) (listing factors that disqualify individuals for whole blood donation); 21 C.F.R. § 640.63(c) (listing factors that disqualify individuals for plasma donation).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 9, at 3 (indicating that MSM
should refrain from donating blood or blood components).
Salbu, supra note 33, at 947 (describing the evolution of blood restrictions).
Memorandum from John C. Petricciani, M.D., Dir., Office of Biologics, Nat’l Ctr. for
Drugs & Biologics, FDA, to All Establishments Collecting Human Blood for Transfusion,
Recommendations to Decrease the Risk of Transmitting Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) from Blood Donors 1 (Mar. 24, 1983), in HIV AND THE BLOOD SUPPLY:
AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS DECISIONMAKING 290–91 (Lauren B. Leveton et al. eds., 1995).
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46

ma or blood. At that time, however, the guidelines only included
gays who were either currently sexually active with multiple partners,
had “overt symptoms of immune deficiency,” or had previously engaged in sexual relations with people who now exhibited such symp47
toms. Blood collection agencies were also asked to provide educational materials on AIDS to donors, and to educate staff about
48
identifying early signs or symptoms of AIDS in potential donors.
Furthermore, physicians were encouraged to provide transfusions on49
ly when “medically necessary.”
Between 1984 and 1996, the Office of Biologics issued biannual
revisions of the exclusion categories originally set forth in the 1983
50
Memorandum. For the purposes of this Comment, the most significant changes occurred in 1986, when the policy began excluding
men who have had sex with another man one or more times since
51
1977 (amending the 1984 language excluding males who have had
52
sex with more than one male since 1979) and in 1992, when the policy
53
included language recommending a lifetime deferral for MSM.
B. Technological Advancements
Since the ban on MSM blood was first instituted in 1983, there
have been several significant technological advancements in the testing of blood for HIV that make more accurate and targeted screening
possible. Beginning in 1985, blood banks initiated universal testing
54
of blood donations. The FDA’s first test, an enzyme-linked immu46
47
48
49
50
51

52

53
54

RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES: AIDS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC
HEALTH 85 (1989).
SHILTS, supra note 28, at 242.
Robert K. Jenner, Chronology of AIDS, in TRANSFUSION-ASSOCIATED AIDS 22 (Robert K.
Jenner ed., 1995).
Id. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Belli, supra note 24, at 339.
Memorandum from Elaine C. Esber, M.D., Dir., Office of Biologics Research & Review
(“OBRR”), Ctr. for Drugs & Biologics, FDA, to All Registered Blood Establishments, Additional Recommendations for Reducing Further the Number of Units of Blood and Plasma Donated for Transfusion or for Further Manufacture by Persons at Increased Risk of
HTLV-III/LAV Infection 1–2 (Oct. 30, 1986).
Memorandum from Elaine C. Esber, M.D., Acting Dir., Office of Biologics Research &
Review, Ctr. for Drugs & Biologics, to All Establishments Collecting Blood for Transfusion
and All Source Plasma (Human) Establishments, Plasma Derived from Therapeutic Plasma Exchange (Dec. 14, 1984).
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 9, at 3.
Hochberg, supra note 30, at 246; see also Blood Testing, AM. RED CROSS,
http://www.redcrossblood.org/learn-about-blood/what-happens-donated-blood/bloodtesting (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (describing the blood tests performed by the Red
Cross).
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nosorbent assay test (the “ELISA test”), was approved in 1985 and de55
tected human antibody produced in response to exposure to HIV.
Because the ELISA test had a high rate of false positives (safe blood
testing positive for HIV), the FDA approved the first confirmatory
56
test, the Western Blot, in 1987. In combination, the ELISA and the
Western Blot tests are considered to be 100% effective for detecting
57
HIV antibodies. However, there is a latency period of up to several
months in which a person infected with HIV has not yet developed
58
the antibodies detected by these tests. Since 2002, however, the routine use of nucleic acid testing (“NAT”) for the HIV virus itself (rather than its antibodies) has further reduced the risk of transfusion
59
transmission of HIV to about one unit per two million donations.
Typically, the test will detect the presence of HIV within nine to eleven days of infection, providing a window period significantly shorter
60
than the more common antibody test.
These technological advancements have called into question the
validity of lifetime deferral policies of MSM blood, both within the
61
United States and abroad. Despite these advancements, however,
62
the Blood Products Advisory Committee (“BPAC”) has refused to
55
56
57
58
59

60

61

62



Belli, supra note 24, at 332–33.
Id. at 334–35.
Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (D.D.C. 1987).
See Belli, supra note 24, at 336.
See Blood Testing, supra note 54 (describing the blood tests performed by the Red Cross);
see also Christopher D. Pilcher et al., Acute HIV Revisited: New Opportunities for Treatment
and Prevention, 113 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 937, 937 (2004), available at
http://www.jci.org/cgi/reprint/113/7/937.pdf. Nonetheless, “[w]hile HIV nucleic acid
amplification assays are now extremely sensitive and can reliably detect HIV by days 9–11
of infection . . . , they are vulnerable to false-positive rates as high as 1%. Such tests remain relatively expensive and have not traditionally been used for routine clinical HIV
screening.” Id. The Red Cross tests “minipools” of sixteen units using NAT. Blood Testing, AM. RED CROSS, http://www.redcrossblood.org/learn-about-blood/what-happensdonated-blood/blood-testing (last visited Nov. 24, 2011).
HIV Testing Basics for Consumers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/testing/resources/qa/be_tested.htm (last modified Apr.
9, 2010).
See James Gallagher, Gay Men Blood Donor Ban to be Lifted, BBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-14824310 (discussing the lifting of the lifetime ban
on blood donations of gay men in England, Scotland and Wales); Joanna Smith, Blood
Donor Agency Wants Lifetime Ban Lifted for Gay Men, THESTAR.COM (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/928904--blood-donor-agency-wantslifetime-ban-lifted-for-gay-men (discussing the Canadian Blood Services change in position to opposing the lifetime deferral).
BPAC, a standing advisory committee to the FDA’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research (“CBER”), is charged with “review[ing] and evaluat[ing] data concerning the
safety, effectiveness, and appropriate use of blood, products . . . intended for use in the
diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of human diseases.” Charter of the Blood Products Advi-
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change the MSM policy. The committee voted down any changes, including a comparable twelve month deferral used for other high-risk
groups for MSM, when advocates pressed for review of the policy in
63
64
both 2000 and 2006. An important difference between the 2000
and 2006 calls for repeal was that the Red Cross, which supplies more
65
than forty percent of the nation’s blood supply, changed its position
66
in favor of repealing the lifetime deferral policy. Finally, in the
summer of 2010, the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Avail67
68
ability also refused to change the policy. This most recent decision
69
has reignited the debate and sparked protests from gay advocates
70
and scientists that the policy is discriminatory and outdated.

63

64

65
66

67

68

69



sory
Committee,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/
AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/
BloodProductsAdvisoryCommittee/ucm121602.htm (last modified May 21, 2010).
Among other things, BPAC advises the Commissioner of Food and Drugs (the “FDA
Commissioner”) “of its findings regarding the safety, effectiveness, screening and testing
(to determine eligibility) of donors . . . and on the quality and relevance of FDA’s research program which provides the scientific support for regulating [blood products].”
Id.
FDA, TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, BLOOD PRODS. ADVISORY COMM. 67TH MEETING 201–
02 (Sept. 14, 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/cber00.
htm#Blood%20Prducts (follow links for 9/14 and 9/15 transcripts under “Blood Products Advisory Committee” heading) (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
FDA, TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, BLOOD PRODUCTS ADVISORY COMMITTEE 86TH
MEETING 60–61 (Mar. 9, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/
transcripts/2006-4206t1.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
Blood Facts and Statistics, AM. RED CROSS, http://www.redcrossblood.org/learn-aboutblood/blood-facts-and-statistics (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
See HHS Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability Meets, AM. RED CROSS (June 11,
2010), http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.1a019a978f421296e81ec89e
43181aa0/?vgnextoid=fee99570ba229210VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD (recommending that the FDA “amend the indefinite deferral currently in place for a male who has
had sex with another male since 177 to a 12-month deferral”); see also Rob Stein, FDA To
Review Ban on Gay Men Donating Blood, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2006, at A06 (discussing the
collective recommendation by the American Red Cross, American Association of Blood
Banks, and America’s Blood Centers to change the FDA policy permanently barring male
blood donors who have had sex with another man as of 1977; the group argues that “current tests and screening methods have improved enough to protect transfusion recipients
without the lifetime ban”).
The Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability was formed to find ways to encourage regular blood donors to donate blood more often than their average 1.5 times
per year. Charter of the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ash/bloodsafety/
advisorycommittee/index.html.
See Caption Notes for Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability Day 2, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (June 11, 2010), http://www.hhs.gov/ash/bloodsafety/
advisorycommittee/pastmeetings/pastmeetings.html#jun10.
See Mroz, supra note 18; Gay Rights Petition to the FDA: Stop Preventing Gay Men from Donating Blood, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions/fda-stop-preventing-gay-men-
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III. A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE: POST-LAWRENCE
The FDA blood policy treats gay men differently than similarly situated straight donors, thereby raising constitutional equal protection concerns. This Part expands upon arguments made by Michael
71
72
Christian Belli in 2003 that the MSM ban is unconstitutional. Since
73
Belli’s paper was written before Lawrence v. Texas, as well as other relevant cases concerning gay rights, it is timely to readdress the issue of
whether the MSM ban would withstand a constitutional challenge
within today’s jurisprudence. For the purposes of this Comment, rather than merely repeating the constitutional problems posed by the
MSM policy, I focus on the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection arguments in a post-Lawrence world. Primarily, I address the level of
74
scrutiny to which the ban might be subjected.
Although Belli’s article employs the rational basis review test when
evaluating the Equal Protection Clause challenges to the MSM poli75
cy, after Lawrence, one could argue that a stricter standard is appropriate when reviewing policies directed toward gays, and would there76
The
fore be appropriate when challenging the MSM policy.
appropriate level of review employed by the judiciary depends upon a
number of factors, such as (1) the class involved, (2) the particular
rights infringed upon, (3) a history of unequal treatment, and (4)
77
other variously weighted factors. Belli bases his analysis upon the

70
71
72

73

74

75

76
77



from-donating-blood (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) (calling on members to sign a petition
asking the FDA to stop discriminating against gay men).
See, e.g., Conan, supra note 17.
Belli, supra note 24, at 362–75.
A similar argument was recently made in Canada, and failed. See Joe Fantauzzi, Thornhill
Gay Advocates Cry Foul Over Blood Ban Ruling, AURORA BANNER (Ontario), Sept. 10, 2010, at
1 (discussing the Superior Court of Ontario's decision to uphold a ban on blood donations by gay men despite the plaintiff's argument that such a ban is unconstitutional).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–76 (2003) (discussing the link between equal protection and due process with respect to homosexual conduct, posing that to criminalize
homosexual acts invites “subject[ing] homosexual persons to discrimination”).
This Comment assumes success on technical issues, such as standing. For a discussion
about stigma satisfying standing requirements, see Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and
Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417, 488 (2007) (“[W]hen the government does stigmatize a
group, members of that group should have standing to argue that the government’s action is unlawful.”).
Belli, supra note 24, at 347–51 (delineating the necessary elements to assert an Equal Protection claim, noting that countervailing factors relating to a legitimate state interest may
dictate sustaining the challenged classification).
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 664–86 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing
whether sexual orientation is a suspect class).
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–42 (1985). Statutes that
classify on the basis of race, alienage, or national origin, and laws that “impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution,” are subjected to the highest standard of re-
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78

fact that the Court in Romer v. Evans used rational basis review. This
Part, however, examines the possibility of strict scrutiny review and
the MSM policy’s viability when held to that standard.
Although the Lawrence majority decision was based in terms of due
process, often due process claims are linked to equal protection
79
claims. The Court in Lawrence said “[e]quality of treatment and the
due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and
80
a decision on the latter point advances both interests.” Concurring
in the decision, Justice O’Connor explicitly based her opinion on
equal protection grounds, instead of due process, explaining,
“[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the
group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review
81
under the Equal Protection Clause.” The Court’s decision indicated
that the Texas sodomy law was a violation of the law because it targeted gay men, similar to the way that the MSM ban targets gay men.
Lawrence was a game changing decision for the recognition of
LGBT legal rights. In Lawrence, the Court departed from traditional
rational basis review without committing to a higher level of scruti82
ny. While Justices Kennedy and O’Connor claim to be applying ra-

78
79

80

81
82

view, strict scrutiny. Id. at 440. Such “will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.” Id. Legislative classifications based on gender or illegitimacy are also subject to a heightened level of review and will fail if, in the case of a
gender, the classification is not “substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest,” or in the case of illegitimacy, the classification is not “substantially related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. at 441. All other classifications will be sustained if
they pass the minimum standard of review, rational basis. Id. at 441–42.
517 U.S. 620, 631–33 (1996) (requiring rational basis review as the level of scrutiny for a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection matter concerning sexual orientation).
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (“[D]ue process and equal protection, far
from having separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix.”).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (“If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does
so remains unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it were
not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When homosexual conduct is
made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to
subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private
spheres. The central holding of Bowers has been brought in question by this case, and it
should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”).
Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See Kristina Brittenham, Note, Equal Protection Theory and the Harvey Milk High School: Why
Anti-Subordination Alone is Not Enough, 45 B.C. L. REV. 869, 889 (2004) (“In two relatively
recent cases, Romer v. Evans, in 1996, and Lawrence v. Texas, in 2003, the Court suggested a
move towards applying a heightened level of scrutiny when sexual orientation is a basis
for discrimination.”).
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tional basis, they required more than the typical nominal justification
83
of the anti-gay legislation when applying that review. Anti-gay statutes now meet resistance in passing the rational basis review scrutiny,
84
as can be seen in cases decided by lower courts on DOMA, Don’t
85
86
87
Ask Don’t Tell, gay marriage, and federal same-sex benefits. Even
state courts have looked to the Lawrence decision as an indicator of
88
heightened scrutiny in dealing with anti-gay policies. Indeed, postLawrence jurisprudence, at the least, must look more critically upon
anti-gay policies.
On the other hand, the Court explicitly claims to be applying rational basis review in Lawrence, does not employ equal protection
89
analysis, and has failed to increase the level of scrutiny with which to
90
evaluate policies discriminating against gays.
Furthermore, cases

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90



See Toni Lester, Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve: Will The New Supreme Court Grant Gays
the Right to Marry?, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 253, 295–96 (2006) (discussing
Justice Kennedy and Justice O’Connor’s opinions in Lawrence v. Texas).
Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 389 n.114 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing Lawrence for the proposition “that the government cannot justify discrimination against samesex couples based on traditional notions of morality alone”). The court therefore held
Section 3 of DOMA, as applied to the plaintiffs, “violates the equal protection principles
embodied in the Fifth Amendment” as “irrational prejudice plainly never constitutes a legitimate government interest.” Id. at 397.
Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 911 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (citing
Lawrence in ruling that “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell constitutes an intrusion upon the personal
and private lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates the rights identified in Lawrence, and is subject to heightened scrutiny” (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (ruling that Proposition 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause in excluding same-sex couples from marriage
and was not rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and citing Lawrence as holding
“homosexual conduct and attraction are constitutionally protected and integral parts of
what makes someone gay or lesbian”).
In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Because there is no rational basis for
denying benefits to the same-sex spouses of [Office of Federal Public Defender] employees . . . the application of DOMA to the [Federal Employee Health Benefits Act] so as
to reach that result is unconstitutional.”).
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948, 953, 959 (Mass. 2003) (citing
Lawrence as support in declaring the Massachusetts ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds).
Justin Reinheimer, What Lawrence Should Have Said: Reconstructing an Equality Approach,
96 CALIF. L. REV. 505, 515 (2008) (“Notably, the Court declined to invalidate the statute
on equal protection grounds, although certiorari was granted on whether the Texas statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, and equality arguments were made during litigation.”). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (noting that “the basis for
declaring the Texas statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause . . . is a tenable argument” (emphasis added)).
Arthur S. Leonard, Lawrence v. Texas and the New Law of Gay Rights, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
189, 200 (2004) (“The Romer opinion never directly discussed whether sexual orientation
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91

post-Lawrence, including decisions on adoption and same sex mar92
riage, have failed to use a heightened level of scrutiny. Regardless,
when addressing anti-gay policies, courts will inevitably be called
upon to decide how Lawrence factors into the analysis.
Importantly, President Obama has recently embraced strict scrutiny of statutes aimed toward LGBT people. Indeed, “the President
has concluded that given a number of factors, including a documented history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual
orientation should be subject to a more heightened standard of scru93
tiny.” Although the President’s view may not be immediately embraced or followed by the Court, it is important support for the position that laws and policies targeting gays should be evaluated under
strict scrutiny, and indicates a shift in the legal analysis of policies and
statutes directed toward LGBT people. It also supports the scrutiny
with which the executive agencies, including the FDA, should review
its own policies. Therefore, following the President’s order, the FDA,
and the courts, should strictly scrutinize the MSM ban.
The MSM ban fails a heightened level of rational basis review.
Even though the law applies only to conduct (men who have had sex
with men), “the conduct targeted . . . is conduct that is closely corre-

91

92

93

discrimination claims would merit heightened scrutiny, or how such claims would fall
along the equal protection scale between suspect and non-suspect classifications.”).
Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 815–17, 826 (11th
Cir. 2004) (holding that neither Romer nor Lawrence requires that the court use heightened scrutiny to strike down the Florida statute banning same-sex adoption).
Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he level of
judicial scrutiny to be applied in determining the validity of state legislative and constitutional enactments under the Fourteenth Amendment is a subject of continuing debate
and disagreement among the Justices. Though the most relevant precedents are murky
we conclude . . . [the Oklahoma ban on same-sex marriage] should receive rational-basis
review under the Equal Protection Clause, rather than a heightened level of judicial scrutiny.”); Kern v. Taney, 11 Pa. D. & C. 5th 558, 570 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2010) (“In Lawrence, the
court expressly declined to extend its holding to governmental recognition or sanctioning of homosexual marriages. Therefore, under the current state of the law, we find that
the right of consenting adults to engage in intimate conduct, without governmental interference, does not involve or guarantee the right to require a government to grant the
parties a marriage.” (citation omitted)); In re J.B., 326 S.W.3d 654, 674 (Tex. App. 2010)
(“We conclude that homosexuals are not a suspect class, that persons who choose to marry persons of the same sex are not a suspect class, and that the Texas law [limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples] . . . does not discriminate against a suspect class.”). But see
Mary M. Kellerman, Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning: Why the Eighth Circuit
Wrongly Upheld Nebraska’s § 29 in the Face of an Equal Protection Challenge, 30 HAMLINE L.
REV. 373, 407 (2007) (noting that Section 29 “fails even the lenient rational basis analysis”).
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement of the Attorney General
on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html.
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lated with being homosexual. Under such circumstances . . . [i]t is
94
instead directed toward gay persons as a class.” While not targeting
“gay men,” but only “men who have sex with men,” the policy creates
a distinction without legal meaning. “After all, there can hardly be
more palpable discrimination against a class than making the con95
duct that defines the class criminal.” The MSM ban targets all gay
men, even those who have no chance of an HIV infection. There is
no sexually active gay man that could pass the ban’s exclusion of a
man who has had sex with a man since 1977.
As explained above, making broad, meritless, class distinctions
that exclude an unpopular group for the sole purpose of excluding
that group is unconstitutional. The Court held in Lawrence that when
the state makes conduct that defines a class as criminal, “that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
96
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.” The
blood ban is distinguished in that it does not make MSM acts criminal. However, under the blanket ban, one is presumed guilty of risky
97
behavior and communicable disease simply by being gay.
The assumption inherent within the MSM policy is that all gay
men are risky donors, enshrining the stigma of gay men in official
government agency policy. This stigmatization is directed to gay men
and everyone else: the ban on MSM blood sends the message to gay
men that they are, by nature, automatically involved in risky sexual
activities. This message undermines education to gay men about activities that decrease the likelihood of obtaining a sexually transmitted disease, such as engaging in protected sexual activity and maintaining monogamous, trusting relationships. The ban also supports
other’s stigmatization of gay men in infusing the idea that being gay
includes having HIV/AIDS. This stigmatization undermines efforts
to decrease the spread of disease and works to disadvantage gay
98
men. To be clear, a person does not get HIV because he is gay, nor

94
95
96
97

98



Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
SuchIsLifeVideos, supra note 21 (“[The FDA] cannot afford to play Russian Roulette with
the nation’s blood supply . . . . Now notice, [the MSM ban] does not have anything to do
with bigotry [or] hatred. This is purely a matter of science, biology, and human
health . . . .”).
See Deborah L. Brimlow, Jennifer S. Cook & Richard Seaton, Stigma and HIV/AIDS: A
Review of the Literature 3 (May 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://test.stigmaactionnetwork.org/atomicDocuments/SANDocuments/201103301649
04-HRSA_2003_Stigma%20and%20HIV-AIDS%20-%20A%20Review%20of%20the%20
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does a person get HIV by having sex with a man. A person is at risk
of being infected with HIV if infected body fluids enter that person’s
99
body, whether or not that person is gay, and whether or not that
person is a man.
Defenders of the policy argue its merits, which range from highlighting the risk of MSM blood to the deficiencies in current testing
for trasmittable infections. These defenders argue that the MSM pol100
icy is rational under the “precautionary principle.”
The FDA defends the policy by stating the high HIV prevalence (and other infec101
tions) in MSM men.
Because blood donor testing does not yet
detect all infected donors, the argument goes, undetected infected
102
The
donors would slip through the cracks if the ban were lifted.
FDA also argues that the MSM policy reduces the likelihood that a
person would unknowingly donate blood during the “window period”
103
of infection.
Furthermore, they argue that excluding MSM decreases risk of blood accidentally given to a patient in error either be104
fore testing is completed or following a positive test.
Lastly, the
FDA claims that there is no alternate set of donor eligibility criteria
found to reliably identify MSM who are not at increased risk for HIV
105
or certain other transfusion transmissible infections.
The defenses articulated by the FDA do not withstand scrutiny.
Without exploring the weaknesses of the precautionary principle it-

99

100

101

102

103
104
105

Literature.pdf (noting that “[s]tigma against HIV/AIDS is often related to the stigma of
homosexuality”).
See How Do You Get HIV or AIDS?, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://aids.gov/hivaids-basics/hiv-aids-101/overview/how-you-get-hiv-aids/ (last revised June 20, 2011); see
also NAT’L CTR. FOR HIV/AIDS, VIRAL HEPATITIS, STD & TB PREVENTION, HIV AND AIDS:
ARE YOU AT RISK? (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/brochures/atrisk.htm (listing ways a person may get HIV, all of which include activity with “someone
with HIV infection”).
Pulver, supra note 20, at 127–28 (“The precautionary principle encourages policymakers
to take the most cautious, risk-averse option whenever an activity potentially threatens
harm to human health.”).
See NAT’L CTR. FOR HIV/AIDS, HEPATITIS, STD, AND TB PREVENTION, HIV AMONG GAY,
BISEXUAL AND OTHER MEN WHO HAVE SEX WITH MEN (MSM) (2010), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/topics/msm/index.htm (noting that gay, bisexual, and other
MSM account for over half of all new HIV infections in the United States in 2006).
Blood Donations from Men Who Have Sex with Other Men Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (June 18, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/
bloodbloodproducts/questionsaboutblood/ucm108186.htm (explaining the rationale
and parameters defining the FDA’s MSM policy).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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106

self, the MSM policy fails to rationally apply that principle. The
most cautious, risk-averse option would be to ban blood from all high
risk groups, including heterosexual donors who engage in unprotected, multiple-partner, sex. The high HIV prevalence in MSM ignores the high prevalence in other groups (or subgroups, such as
107
108
young, black MSM ), such as African American females, and does
not serve as a justifiable distinction.
That blood donor testing does not yet detect all infected donors
or that donors may give during the “window period” applies equally
to all donors, with no higher risk posed by MSM. Similarly, the risk of
blood accidentally given to a patient in error either before testing, is
completed or following a positive test is always present, regardless of
whom the donors are. Alternate donor eligibility criteria could target
behaviors that make potential donors an increased risk for HIV or
certain other transfusion transmissible infections and have been ex109
tensively researched and suggested. While the MSM ban serves as a
broad exclusion with the purpose of protecting the blood supply, it
does so by being both over-inclusive in excluding healthy gay donors,
and under-inclusive in admitting risky non-gay donors.
By singling out one group, gay men, the policy is facially discriminatory; moreover, it is not rationally related to its stated goal of protecting the donor pools, insofar as it does not apply to other high-risk
groups. A ban that discriminates against a marginalized group without meritorious justification violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fifth Amendment and should be deemed unconstitutional.
IV. AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT CHALLENGE
Not only is the MSM ban unconstitutional, it is also illegal by violating the protections ensured by the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”). Because the FDA is an Administrative Agency, the APA go-

106
107

108

109

See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003) (discussing why the precautionary principle should be rejected).
See Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, & TB Prevention, New
Multi-Year Data Show Annual HIV Infections in United States Relatively Stable (Aug. 3,
2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/HIVIncidencePressRelease
.html (“[B]lack MSM were the only group to experience a statistically significant increase
in new infections over the four-year time period studied.”).
See
Minority
Women's
Health,
WOMENSHEALTH.GOV
(May
18,
2010),
http://www.womenshealth.gov/minority/africanamerican/hiv.cfm (“[W]omen account
for more than 1 in 4 new HIV/AIDS cases in the United States. Of these newly infected
women, about 2 in 3 are African-American.”).
See WARDENSKI ET AL., supra note 12.
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verns it and its actions are reviewable by the courts.
Under the
APA, “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
111
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” Once a
court finds that the agency’s action is final, it may then consider six
factors to determine whether that action is unlawful: (1) is it arbitrary or capricious; (2) is it unconstitutional; (3) is it outside of the
agency’s jurisdiction; (4) did the agency fail to follow statutory procedures; (5) is it unsupported by substantial evidence; or (6) is it un112
warranted by the facts?
Therefore, it is possible that a gay donor
could bring suit under the APA challenging the MSM policy.
An APA challenge is potentially even more advantageous here because it allows avenues for a court to rule that the MSM policy is illeg113
al, without ruling on its constitutionality.
Similar arguments have
been made about potential challenges of the FDA’s ban on gay
114
sperm. Like the MSM ban, the FDA also categorically excludes men
115
who have had sex with men from sperm donor pools. Rather than
repeat those arguments here, this Part demonstrates how an APA
challenge is similarly applicable to the MSM ban. This Part outlines
the necessary components to an APA challenge, and discusses the
possible drawbacks of this approach. Although other potential APA
challenges are available, this Comment focuses on the claim that the
FDA’s MSM ban is arbitrary and capricious.
The first question in an APA challenge is whether the agency deci116
sion constitutes “final action.”
The FDA’s action here is through
110
111
112
113

114

115
116

See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–50 (1967) (discussing when agency action
is judicially reviewable).
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
Id. § 706.
See Carmel Shachar, Administrative Law v. Constitutional Law: The Correct Decision on FDA's
Treatment of Plan B, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 523, 526 (2009) (explaining that APA challenges to Plan B regulations were more persuasive than Constitutional challenges); see also Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (ruling based on APA
challenge to FDA’s course of conduct regarding the emergency contraceptive rather than
constitutional challenge).
See Boso, supra note 24, at 853 (explaining how the similar FDA ban on gay sperm is potentially challengeable under the APA); see also Letter from John Givner, Staff Attorney,
Lambda Legal, to Div. of Dockets Mgm’t, Food & Drug Admin. 1, 3–4 & 4 n.4 (Aug. 23,
2004),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/dailys/04/aug04/
083004/04d-0193-c00017-vol1.pdf (arguing that the ban on sperm donation is arbitrary
and capricious).
See Letter from John Givner, supra note 114, at 3–4 & 4 n.4.
See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797 (1992) (“[T]o determine when an agency
action is final, [the Court] ha[s] looked to, among other things, whether its impact is sufficiently direct and immediate and has a direct effect on . . . day-to-day business.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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guidance documents, stating that MSM constitutes “high risk.”
“Guidance documents do not themselves establish legally enforceable
rights or responsibilities and are not legally binding on the public or
118
the agency.”
However, the courts have ruled that a guidance may
amount to a final rule when its impact “is sufficiently direct and im119
mediate and has a direct effect on . . . day-to-day business.” Because
the guidance materials here are final to the same extent that guidance documents banning gay sperm are final, namely that gay men
are prohibited from donating in either sphere, those arguments
120
equally apply here.
An obstacle in an APA challenge to the MSM blood ban is that the
FDA is following the opinion of an advisory committee, rather than
making the arbitrary conclusions itself. Congress enacted the Federal
Advisory Committee Act in 1972 to control the growth and ensure the
open operation of the “numerous committees, boards, commissions,
councils, and similar groups which have been established to advise officers and agencies in the executive branch of the Federal Govern121
ment.”
To achieve these objectives, the FACA places a number of
procedural restrictions on those bodies that constitute “advisory
122
committees.” Although courts have held that Congress did not in-

117
118
119

120

121

122

See Eligibility Requirements, supra note 8.
The Food and Drug Administration’s Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 8961 (1997).
Franklin, 505 U.S. at 797; see also Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021–24
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (discussing when agency action constitutes final action); Todd D. Rakoff,
The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
159, 167 (2000) (discussing the legal effect of guidelines generated without promulgating
a “nominally-legally-binding regulation”).
See Boso supra note 24, at 854–58 (“[T]he FDA’s recommendations have a direct and immediate impact on the . . . industry, and second, the industry relies on those recommendations.”).
See Pub. L. No. 92-463, § 2(a), 86 Stat. 770, 770 (1972) (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 2(a)
(2006)) (defining an advisory committee as “any committee, board, commission, council,
conference, panel, task force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof” that is “established or utilized” by the President or an agency “in the interest of obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or more agencies
or officers of the Federal Government”); see also Grigsby Brandford & Co. v. United
States, 869 F. Supp. 984, 1001 (D.D.C. 1994) (defining an Advisory Committee as “any
committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar
group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup thereof, which is established . . . for the
purpose of obtaining advice or recommendations on issues or policies which are within the scope
of his or her responsibilities” (internal quotations omitted)). See generally Pub. Citizen v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 438, 466 (1989) (finding that public interest groups had
standing to bring suit under FACA).
See NRDC v. Abraham, 223 F. Supp. 2d 162, 175 (D.D.C. 2002) (explaining the Federal
Advisory Committee Act).
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tend for FACA to be enforced through a private right of action,
plaintiffs are nevertheless entitled to enforce FACA’s substantive re124
quirements through the judicial review provisions of the APA. The
APA and constitutional requirements of the FDA, however, are not
shielded from challenge by the FACA, because reliance on an advi125
sory committee’s decision may constitute final agency action.
Therefore, that an advisory committee produces the guidelines does
not protect the FDA’s promulgation of an arbitrary and capricious
policy from an APA challenge.
To determine the scope of review for the FDA’s final decision
banning MSM blood, a court must determine whether the decision
126
was reached through formal or informal rulemaking.
As outlined
127
above, the FDA solicited comments regarding its guidance documents rather than following the formal procedures of formal rulemaking, and, therefore, its decision regarding MSM blood would
probably be reviewed within a similar framework as an informal
128
rulemaking. The court explained in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe that in reviewing informal rulemaking,
[T]he court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error

123

124

125

126

127
128

See, e.g., Int’l Brominated Solvents Ass’n v. Am. Conf. of Governmental Indus. Hygienists,
Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1376 (M.D. Ga. 2005) (citing awareness of only two decisions
in which FACA has been considered in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which held that there is no implied private right of action without basis in statutory text). “In each case, the result was the same: Congress did
not intend for FACA to be permit a private right of action.” Int’l Brominated Solvents Ass’n,
393 F. Supp. 2d at 1376.
See id. at 1320 (“Although Plaintiffs do not have a cause of action that arises under FACA,
they are nevertheless entitled to enforce FACA’s substantive requirements through the
judicial review provisions of the APA.”).
See id. at 1381 (noting that reliance on an advisory committee’s recommendation could
be considered to meet the Supreme Court’s definition of “action” because it is one
“manner in which an agency may exercise its power. . . . Moreover, it can be considered
final for purposes of the APA because using . . . [those recommendations] represents the
consummation of . . . [the advisory committee’s] decision-making process and imposes
certain obligations from which legal consequences flow.” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414–15 (1971) (stating that
“[r]eview under the substantial-evidence test is authorized only when the agency action is
taken pursuant to a rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedure Act itself,” and
that de novo review of whether the action was “unwarranted by the facts” is authorized
only when the action is adjudicatory in nature (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See supra notes 59–60, 62.
See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 159 (2007) (“In the case of informal rulemaking
under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, an agency must give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rule-making process through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without the opportunity for an oral presentation.”).
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of judgment. . . . Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching
and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is
129
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
130

This review is analogous to the limited rational basis review.
The
review is furthermore limited by the fact that the agency’s decision is
131
science-based.
Because agencies are deemed experts of highly
technical issues, courts are not viewed as the proper venue for most
policy decisions. However, if the court finds that an agency action is
132
arbitrary and capricious, the action is set aside.
Courts generally give informal agency action a high degree of deference; that deference, however, is not a rubber stamp. In some in133
stances, the Court has found an agency action to be arbitrary.
Agency action is arbitrary when an agency offers “insufficient reasons
134
for treating similar situations differently.”
Applying the standard
set in Volpe, a searching and careful inquiry into the facts reveals that
the MSM ban is facially irrational. As explained above, the FDA provides no rational reasoning for why MSM blood is barred for a lifetime deferral, yet, heterosexual donors engaged in similarly high-risk,
or riskier behavior, are only deferred one year, if at all. “[O]nly [in]
the most extreme cases do antibodies manifest later than six months
following transmission,” regardless of sexual orientation or sexual
135
practice.
Indeed, “all testing is prone to error, human and other129
130

131

132

133

134
135

401 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted).
See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 532 (1985)
(finding that courts afford agencies’ “findings of fact great deference” under the minimum rationality or rational basis test).
See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM
CASES AND MATERIALS 868–92 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing judicial review of science-based
decisions); see also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (“When
examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a
reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.”); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla.
Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972) (“[W]hen resolution of that question depends on ‘engineering and scientific’ considerations, we recognize the relevant agency’s
technical expertise and experience, and defer to its analysis unless it is without substantial
basis in fact.”); Browning-Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey v. Muszynski, 899 F.2d 151, 160 (2d Cir.
1990) (“Courts should be particularly reluctant to second-guess agency choices involving
scientific disputes that are in the agency’s province of expertise.”).
See Pub. Citizen v. Barshefsky, 939 F. Supp. 31, 37 (D.D.C. 1996) (“The APA requires the
court to set aside agency actions that are ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006))).
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency
has . . . entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to . . . the product of agency expertise.”).
See Transactive Corp. v. United States, 91 F.3d 232, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Boso, supra note 24, at 863.
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wise, but” the FDA does not provide facts that suggest that the rate of
error diminishes after a year for heterosexual donors, but not for gay
136
men. Thus, the FDA’s MSM ban treats similar situations different137
ly, and it is irrational in light of the FDA’s interest in protecting
public health. “Under these rules, a heterosexual man who had unprotected sex with HIV-positive [female] prostitutes would be OK as a
donor one year later, but a gay man in a monogamous, safe-sex rela138
tionship is not.” Such a distinction cannot be held to be rational.
The distinction between MSMs and men who have sex with women, without more, is not rationally related to the prevention of disease transmission. In Motor Vehicle, the Court reasoned that agency
actions are irrational if the agency “fail[s]to consider an important aspect
139
of the problem.”
In this case, an important aspect of the problem is
unquestionably the growing number of new HIV transmissions resulting from non-MSM activity, and that, of those diagnosed with HIV,
almost half transmitted the disease through means other than MSM
140
contact.
Rather than focus on the unsafe nature of any sexual act
performed by any sexually active person, the FDA focuses on the class
of the parties engaged in sexual acts (gay men), and ignores the reality of disease transmission. Accordingly, under Motor Vehicle, the
FDA’s failure to consider this important health aspect renders its ac141
tion arbitrary and capricious.
136
137
138
139
140

141



Id.
See Transactive Corp., 91 F.3d at 237 (“[A]gency action is arbitrary when the agency offered
insufficient reasons for treating similar situations differently.”).
See Boso, supra note 24, at 863 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(emphasis added).
See Centers for Disease Control, Diagnoses of HIV Infection and AIDS in the United States and
Dependent Areas, 2008, 20 HIV SURVEILLANCE REP., 7, 17–18 (2010), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/surveillance/resources/reports/2008report (“Estimat[ing] rates
of diagnoses of HIV infections among adults and adolescents, by sex and race/ethnicity”
and showing the number of HIV diagnoses increased among male and female adults and
adolescents exposed through heterosexual contact).
See Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43 (finding an agency decision “arbitrary and capricious if
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise”). For decisions holding as arbitrary agency action based on scientific determinations, see Association
of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 632 F.3d 584, 593 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding the EPA’s failure to
act in light of the strong evidence indicating inadequacies in current plan arbitrary and
capricious); Midwater Trawlers Cooperative v. Department of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 720–21
(9th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that an agency decision was arbitrary where it was demonstrated that the rule was a “product of pure political compromise, not reasoned scientific
endeavor”); Estate of Aitken v. Shalala, 986 F. Supp. 57, 61–62, 64 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding
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The APA challenge of the MSM policy is by no means a slamdunk. Courts are very reluctant to overturn administrative agencies’
142
decisions generally, and even more so when those decisions involve
143
scientific determinations.
Here, however, is a case in which the
agency decision that is arbitrary and capricious is not based upon
conflicting scientific evidence nor differences in opinion about what
constitutes high-risk conduct. Indeed, there is no technical subject
for the court to address. Rather, the policy is arbitrary on its face because it treats all members of a class as though they are engaged in
144
high-risk behavior, while ignoring those in that class who are not,
and those of other classes who are similarly engaged in high-risk behavior. The FDA policy invents a distinction between MSM and heterosexual donors that is scientifically untenable; a gay man does not
contract AIDS by being gay, but by engaging in risky behavior, the
145
same as heterosexuals. The FDA policy does nothing to address the
risky heterosexual behavior, and, instead, treats all gay men as dangerously sexually active.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM
As shown above, neither the constitutional equal protection arguments, nor the APA arbitrary and capricious challenge, are guaran-

142

143

144
145

grounds for agency decision to be considered arbitrary where the explanation currently
offered by HCFA for its decision ran counter to the evidence before the agency).
See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d 390, 399 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that FDA’s
“judgments as to what is required to ascertain the safety and efficacy of drugs fall squarely
within the ambit of the FDA’s expertise and merit deference from us”); see also Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992) (declaring ruling by Tenth Circuit an unauthorized
“policy choice,” and explaining that “[t]he court should not supplant the agency’s findings merely by identifying alternative findings that could be supported by substantial evidence”); Henley v. FDA, 77 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that although plaintiff’s
arguments were “sound and cogent,” and the Court itself “might not have chosen the
FDA’s course had it been [theirs] to chart,” the APA precludes courts for substituting
their judgment for that of an agency).
See NRDC v. Fox, 93 F. Supp. 2d 531, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“In the face of conflicting evidence at the frontiers of science, courts’ deference to expert determinations should be at
its greatest.”) (quoting Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also NRDC v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1404 (4th Cir.
1993) (holding where record supported both water quality standard urged by plaintiffs and one chosen by EPA, “the best course of action is to leave this debate to the world
of science to ultimately be resolved by those with specialized training in this field”).
And, sadly, even persons who are not gay, but appear to be gay, making blood bank
nurses the sexual-orientation police. See Roth, supra note 22.
See Naomi G. Goldberg & Gary J. Gates, Effects of Lifting the Blood Donation Ban on Men Who
Have Sex with Men, 5 PITTSBURGH. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 49, 57 (2011) (“If the current MSM ban were completely lifted, we estimate that an additional 130,150 men would
likely donate 219,200 additional pints of blood each year.”).
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teed to persuade a court to overturn this discriminatory MSM policy.
A third approach, however, may hold promise. This Part suggests
that the FDA, as an administrative body, has a role in determining
whether its own policies are constitutional, and, therefore, could be
persuaded to change the MSM policy, not based upon scientific evidence, but rather based upon its understanding of what the Equal
Protection Clause requires; namely, that gay men, as a class, be
treated equally to other similarly situated donors.
This Part seeks to expand upon arguments proposed by Gillian
146
Metzger and apply them to the role the FDA plays in constitutional
decision-making. She explains, “constitutional law and ordinary administrative law are inextricably linked: Statutory and regulatory
measures are created to address constitutional requirements . . . and
agencies are encouraged to take constitutional concerns seriously in
147
their decisionmaking.” The indeterminacy of constitutional mean148
ings opens a wide door for agency interpretation. Because of this,
agencies continually consider constitutional boundaries in making
149
Agencies are uniquely accountable and accessible to
their policy.
the public, and therefore may better reflect constitutional norms of
150
the community.
Indeed, constitutional questions such as whether
gay men should be a protected class can be decided at the agency
151
152
level, and possibly should be decided by agencies.

146
147
148

149

150

151

Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM.
L. REV. 479 (2010).
Id. at 484.
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 58 (1997) (“[R]easonable citizens, lawyers, and judges differ
widely about what methodology should be used to interpret the Constitution, about
which substantive principles the Constitution embodies, and about how, in more practical
terms, constitutional norms should be protected by doctrine.”).
See Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the
Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2000) (explaining that administrators originally interpreted the First Amendment and constitutionality of police power limitations
on free speech); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 564–75, 580–
600 (1990) (arguing that “phantom constitutional norms”—norms rooted in due process,
equal protection, and the First Amendment, but fundamentally at odds with plenary
power doctrine—underlie many immigration decisions).
See generally Metzger, supra note 146, at 502 (“Congress and the President frequently impose statutory and regulatory restrictions on administrative decisionmaking that reflect
their desire for agencies to attend to constitutitional concerns.”).
See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change:
The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1323–25 (2006) (arguing expansion of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to cover sex discrimination “was
forged in the Equal Rights Amendment’s defeat”).
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Agencies have been called upon to determine the scope of the
153
Equal Protection Clause before, and should do so when their policies clearly animate concerns of class discrimination. Arthur Caplan,
former chair of the Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability, said the MSM policy “doesn’t make any sense, except as a matter of discrimination, to exclude one risk group completely and let
154
others sort of go with abandon, if you will.” Although new Advisory
Committee members are sworn to “support and defend the constitu155
tion of the United States against all enemies; foreign and domestic,”
156
neither the minutes from the 2000 or 2006 meeting, nor the rec157
ommendations offered after the 2010 meeting, refer to the Constitution at all. Indeed, the committee was apprised of the constitution158
al issues presented by the discriminatory MSM policy.
The
Committee should be called upon to align its MSM policy with the
constitutional mandates of the Equal Protection Clause. Just as the
Obama administration has decided that laws targeting the LGBT
159
community should be under strict scrutiny, branches of the government other than the courts are at liberty to come to more expansive readings of the Constitution. The FDA, charged with maintaining the public health, has an interest in securing its reputation as an
agency dedicated to scientific conclusions rather than policies based
on discriminatory stigma.

152
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155

156
157
158

159

See generally Metzger, supra note 146, at 486 (“Agencies are not only well positioned to enforce constitutional norms effectively, but they are also better able than courts to determine how to incorporate constitutional concerns into a given regulatory scheme with the
least distruption.”).
Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace,
1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 800–01 (2010) (describing FCC rulemaking interpreting the scope of the Equal Protection Clause).
Conan, supra note 17.
See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BLOOD
SAFETY AND AVAILABILITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 3 (2007), available at www.hhs.gov/ash/bloodsafety/advisorycommittee/minutes/may2007.pdf (“Dr.
Bracey invited the new members to come to the fore and Dr. Agwunobi swore them in.”).
See supra notes 63 and 64.
See supra note 68.
See Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir., A.C.L.U. Wash. Legislative Office & James Esseks,
Dir., A.C.L.U. Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender & AIDS Project, to Jerry A. Holmberg,
Advisory Comm. on Blood Safety & Availability (June 8, 2010), available at
www.aclu.org/files/assets/fdabloodban_comments_20100610.pdf.
See Press Release, supra note 93.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment is not intended to distract from or minimize the
160
Indeed, this author
dangerous infection rates among MSM men.
believes that the alarming figures of HIV infection among gay men
should serve to increase awareness among the gay community and
spark public policy that serves to decrease the rates of new infections
by increasing the availability and commonality of testing and treatment. Nonetheless, the FDA’s MSM policy is unconstitutional, arbitrary and capricious, and discriminatory against gay men in a way that
should violate administrative understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause. This Comment has sought to build upon the claims made by
others so that this twenty-six year old ban may finally be lifted. As a
result, not only will the blood supply benefit, but also the stigma attached to the blanket ban on gay men will no longer be legitimized.

160

See Donald G. McNeil, New H.I.V. Cases Remain Steady Over a Decade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
2011, at A16 (explaining that the HIV epidemic “is still concentrated primarily in gay
men”).

